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676 ESTATE OF WAlTS [23 C.2d 
253, 263 [86 P. 187]; People v. Costello, 21 Ca1.2d 760 [135 
P.2d 164]; see People v. Ryan, 152 Cal. ;'164 [92 P. 853].) 
There can be no justifiable reliance on decisions allowing this 
instruction in view of the repeated warnings by this court 
that district attorneys should not offer and trial courts should 
not give it. A decision that cannot properly be relied upon 
cannot serve to justify adherence to an interpretation it con-
demns. Nothing is gained and much is lost by insisting upon 
a mechanical adherence to precedent that perpetuates an ad-
mittedly erroneous interpretation of a statute and defeats 
the very purpose of the Legislature in enacting it. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
[So F. No. 16906. In Bank. Feb. 10, 1944.] 
Estate of FREDERICK ALBERT W AIT~, Deceased. THE 
ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY 
COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, V. CHAR-
LOTTE E. LEET, as Administratrix, etc., Respondent. 
[8. F. No. 16907. In Bank. Feb. 10, 1944.] 
Estate of IVAN R. MILLER, Deceased. THE ATCHISON, 
TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY (a 
Corporation), Appellant, V. CHARLOTTE E. LEET, as 
Administratrix, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Decedents' Estates - Jurisdiction - Existence of Property-
Cause of Action for Death.-A cause of action for wrongful 
death under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S. 
C.A., § 51 et seq.) is "estate" within Prob. Code, § 301; au-
thorizing the probate court to appoint an administrator, 
even though the decedent was not a resident of the state and 
there are no other assets. 
[2] Id. - Jurisdiction - Situs of Property - Choses in Action.-
Under the rule that a debt will be regarded as an asset 
[1] Cause of action for death as justifying appointment of 
administrator, note, 59 A.L.R. 92.8ee, also, 21 Am.Jur. 396. 
[2] See 11A Cal.Jur. 114; 21 Am.Jur. 401. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Decedents' Estates, § 4L 
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wherever the debtor is subject to suit, a cause of action for 
wrongful death under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
has a situs, for purposes of administration, in any county 
where the defendant does business. 
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Alameda 
County refusing to set aside appointment of an administra-
trix. Leon E. Gray, Judge. Affirmed. 
J. C. Gibson, Leo E. Sievert, H. K. Lockwood and L. W. 
Butterfield for Appellant. 
Hildebrand, Bills & McLeod and Louis H.Brownstone for 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, The Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe Railway Company, appeals from two orders deny-
ing motions to set aside the appointment of Charlotte E. 
Leet as administratrix of the estate of Ivan R. Miller and 
of the estate of Frederick Albert Wa.its. These appeals have 
been consolidated because they involve substantially the same 
facts and the same legal question. The petitions· f'or letters 
of administration were filed in the Superior Oourtof A.la-
meda County on August 15, 1942. The· petition in the Miller 
estate alleged that Ivan R. Miller was a resident of Al-
buquerque, New Mexico, where he died, and tha.t "it is nec-
essary that an Administratrix be appointed in order to pros-
ecute a claim for damages against said Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe Railroad Co., for the death of' said deceased, under 
the provisions of' the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 
U.S.C.A., sec. 51 et seq.) ; that under the provisions of'said 
act, such suit, although prosecuted in the name of' the Ad-
ministratrix, is f'or the benefit of the mother of said decedent, 
and that any recovery in such action belongs to the mother 
of said decedent as his heir at law, and is not a part of the 
estate of said decedent .... " The petition also alleged that 
the foregoing claim is the sole estate of said decedent. The 
allegations of the petition in Estate of Waits were identical, 
except that there it appeared that Frederick Albert Waits, 
who died in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was a resident of 
Navajo County, Arizona, and that any recovery under the 
liability act would be for the benefit of his wife and minor 
son. On September 18, 1942, these petitions were ·granted, 
i I 
i: 
i , , 
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and letters of administration were issued to Charlotte Leet. 
On October 3, 1942, in the Contra Costa County Superior 
Court, Oharlotte Leet, as administratrix of the estate of 
Ivan R. Miller, brought suit against petitioner for negli-
gently causing the death of Miller. On the same date she 
brought a similar action against petitioner for causing the 
death of Waits. On October 15, 1942, petitioner moved to 
set aside the appointment of respondent as administratrix. 
On January 4, 1943, both motions were denied. 
[1] Petitioner contends that the probate court lacked 
jurisdiction to appoint respondent as administratrix. This 
cOlltention must be sustained unless the cause of action for 
wrongful death can be regarded as "estate" within Alamed~ 
County, for the Probate Code authorizes administration only 
in the county in which the decedent was a resident, or where 
he left estate. (Prob. Code, sec. 301.) 
It is generally recognized that the courts of a state 
other than that in which the decedent was domiciled cannot 
appoint an administrator if there are no assets within the 
jurisdiction. (See 21 Am.Jur. 395; Restatement,Conflict of 
Laws, sec. 467.) It is also generally recognized that a 
cause of action for wrongful death, which is enforceable 
within the jurisdiction, and which the personal representa-
tiveis charged with enforcing, is such an asset. (State v. 
Probate Court, 149 Minn. 464 [184 N.W. 43] ; Lancaster &-
Wallace v. Sexton (Tex.Civ.App.), 245 S.W. 958; Southern 
Pac. Co. v. De Valle Da Costa, 190 F. 689 [111 C.C.A. 417] ; 
Jordan v. Chicago &- Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 Wis. 581 
[104 N.W. 803, 110 Am.St.Rep. 865, 4 Ann.Cas. 1113, 1 
L.R.A.N.S. 885] ; McCarron v. New York Cent. R. Co., 239 
Mass. 64 [131 N.E. 478] ; Lttnd v. City of Seattle, 163 Wash. 
254 [1 P.2d 301]; Berry v. Rutland Railroad Co., 103 Vt. 
388 [154 A. 671]; In re Mayo, 60 S.C. 401 [38 S.E. 634, 
54 L.R.A. 660] ; Howard v. Nashville C. &- St. L. Ry. Co., 133 
Tenn. 19 [179 S.W. 380]; see 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws 
[1935], p. 1457 et seq.; 21 Am.Jur. 396; 59 A.L.R. 92; Re-
statement, Conflict of Laws, sec. 467.) It has thus frequently 
been held that an administrator may be appointed to enforce 
a cause of action for death under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act even though there are no other assets in the 
jurisdiction. (State v. Probate Court, supra; Lancaster &-
Wallace v. Sexton, supra; McCarron v. New York Oent. R. 
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Co., supra; Howard v. NashvilleO. &- St. L. Ry. 00., supra . .> 
The Federal Employers' Liability Act authorizes SUlt 
by the aggrieved party in any' state where ~he carrier does 
business. (45 U.S.C.A., sec. 59; Miles v. Illmots Central R. 
Co., 315 U.S. 698 [62 S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed 1129].) Since. a 
snit requires the appointment of a personal representatIve 
(A.merican R. R. Co. v. Birch, 224 U.S. 547 [32 S.Ct: 603, 
56 L.Ed. 879]), who is ordinarily allowed to sue only In the 
state of his appoint.ment (see Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1913). re-
fusal to appoint an administrator in a state where snit is 
authorized by the act would uullify the \'ery ri~ht the act 
grants. (See Howard v. Nashville C. &- St. L. Ry. Co. suo 
pra.) An estate mnst exist before an administrator can 
be appointed, for if there wC're no estate there would be no 
function for the administrator to p~rform. (See Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws, comment to sec. 467.) Enforcement 
of a cause of action for wrongful death under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act is a function that can be performed 
only by the administrator, and snch a cause of action should 
therefore be regarded as an estate justifying his appointmept. 
Petitioner relies on lang-uage in Michigan Central Railway 
Co. v. Vrecland, 227 U.S. 59, 68 [33 S.Ot. 192, 57 L.Ed. 
417], to the effect that the cause of action provided by the 
act is independent of any other that the deceased might ha .... e. 
This reasoning applies to any cause of action conseqnent to 
the death of the decedent, such as a cause of action for the 
payment of life insurance on a policy executed for the bene-
fit of the estate. If a cause of action matures concurrently 
with the decedent's death, it does not follow that no admin-
istrator should be appointed to enforce it. Petitioner relies 
also on language in Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S 38, 
41 [50 S.Ot. 207, 74 L.Ed. 686], to the effect that the cause 
of action under the act is not part of the estate of the de-
ceased and on similar statements in Ruiz v. Santa Barbara 
Gas etc. 00., 164 Cal. 188 [128 P. 330] ; Estate of Riccorni, 
185 Cal. 458 [197 P. 97, 14 A.L.R. 509], and Costa v. Supe-
rior Court, 137 Cal. 79 [69 P. 840], concerning the Califor-
nia wrongful death statute. In the Lindgren case, however, 
the court held merely that no suit could be brought under 
the act unless one of the designated beneficiaries survived. 
In Ruiz v. Santa Barbara it was held only that a special ad-
ministrator could commence and maintain an action under 
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the California statute, and that the general administrator 
could subsequently be substituted as plaintiff. In making the 
statement on which petitioner relies, the court was concerned 
only with the fact that the cause of action for wrongful death 
is for the benefit of persons who may not necessarily share 
in the remainder of the estate. The other California cases 
cited were likewise concerned with the fact that the cause 
of action for wrongful death is for such statutory beneficiaries 
and that the recovery is divided according to principles 
other than those ordinarily governing decedents' estates. In 
these respects the cause of action for wrongful death differs 
from most of the assets constituting the estate, but it resem-
bles I1l1ch assets in being held by the administrator and en-
forced by him on behalf of the beneficiaries. This resem-
blance is significant. Any assets controlled by the ad-
ministrator should be regarded as an estate within the mean-
ing of the code section authorizing the appointment of the 
administrator. 
[2] Petitioner contends tbat the situs of a debt is properly 
the domicile of the creditor, and that even if this cause of 
action is regarded as an estate it does not have its situs in 
Alameda County. The cause of action for wrongful death, 
however, is vested exclusively in the personal representative 
of the deceased (American R. 00. v. Birch, supra), and the 
logical result of this contention would be that this cause of 
action had no situs until an administrator was appointed. An 
intangible, unlike real or tangible per80nal property, has no 
physical characteristics that would serve as a basis for assign-
ing it to a particular locality. The location assigned to it 
depends on what action is to be taken with reference to it. 
It has therefore been widely held that a debt has its situs at 
the domicile of the debtor for purposes of administration, 
since it may be necessary to sue him there and to have an 
administrator appointed to bring suit. (See 3 Beale, Conflict 
of Laws [1935], p. 1452; see 23 Minn. L. Rev. 221.) By the 
same reasoning a debt will be regarded as an asset wherever 
the debtor is subject to suit. (New England Mutual Life Ins. 
00. v. Woodworth, 111 U.S. 138 [4 S.Ct. 364, 28 L.Ed. 379] ; 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Vogel's Executrix, 76 Ala. 
441 [52 Am.Rep. 344] j see 23 Minn. L. Rev. 221.) The Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act makes defendant subject to 
suit on this cause of action wherever defendant does business. 
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Sinee defendant does business in Alameda County the cause 
of action has a situs in Alameda County for purposes of 
administration. 
The orders are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J~, Edmonds, J., Carter, 
J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
(S. F. No. 16950. In Bank. Feb. 10, 1944.J 
O. D. ADAJ\iS, Appellant, v. AMERICAN PRESIDENT 
LINES, LTD. (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Presumptions-Orders on Motion for New Trial.--
Where an order granting a new trial did not .specify iDflUf-
ficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, that ground 
cannot be considered on appeal unless the evidence is without 
conflict and insufficient as matter of law. 
[2] Seamen-Injuries to Seamen-Jones Act.-Recovery of dam-
ages by an employee under the Jones Act (46U.S.C.A., §'688) 
is predicated on negligence of the employer •. 
[3] Master and Servant-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Neg-
ligence of Fellow Servant as Defense.-TheFederIlLEmploy-
ers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A., §51et seq.) abrogates the 
common-law rule that an employee must bear the risk 'of in-
jury or death through the fault or:negligence of a fellow 
servant, ,and applies the principle, of respondeat superior to 
impose liability on the employer. " . 
[4] Seamen-Injuries to Seamen-Liability ofMaster.~The mas-
ter is not liable for injury to a seaman arising from the ,neg-
ligence of a servant acting beyond the scope of his em-
ployment. 
[5] Master and Servant - Injuries to Employees - Questions of 
i:..aw.-The question of what acts are within the scope of em-
ployment is one of law. 
[2] See 10 Oal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. 275; 48 Am.Jur. 123. 
[3] See 16 Oal.Jur. 1093; 35 Am.Jur. 760. 
McK. Dig .. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1209a; [2,.4, 9, 
10] Seamen, § 2; [3] Master and Servllnt, § 203; [5] Master and 
Servant, § 170; [6, 7] Seamen, § 1; [8J Master and Servant, § 62; 
Seamen, §1; [l1J Trial, § 195. 
